Reference
N. Groot, B. De Schutter, and H. Hellendoorn, "Existence conditions for an
optimal affine leader function in the reverse Stackelberg game,"
Proceedings of the 15th IFAC Workshop on Control Applications of
Optimization (CAO'12), Rimini, Italy, pp. 56-61, Sept. 2012.
Abstract
We investigate the solvability of the reverse Stackelberg game. Here, a leader
player acts first by presenting a leader function that maps the follower
decision space into the leader decision space. Subsequently, the follower acts
by determining his optimal decision variable. Such a game setting can be
adopted within a multi-level optimization approach for large-scale control
problems like road tolling. However, due to the complexity of the general game,
results often rely on specific examples. As a starting point towards developing
a systematic approach for the use of reverse Stackelberg games in control, a
characterization of cases is given in which the desired leader equilibrium can
be achieved by an affine leader function. Here, we focus on the single-leader
single-follower deterministic, static (one-shot) case. This characterization
follows a geometric approach and extends the special cases considered in the
existing literature to also incorporate the more general case in which
nonconvex and nonsmooth sublevel sets apply.
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BibTeX
@inproceedings{GroDeS:12-003,
author = {Groot, Noortje and De Schutter, Bart and Hellendoorn, Hans},
title = {Existence Conditions for an Optimal Affine Leader Function in
the Reverse {Stackelberg} Game},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 15th IFAC Workshop on Control Applications
of Optimization (CAO'12)},
address = {Rimini, Italy},
pages = {56--61},
month = sep,
year = {2012}
}