Reference
Z. Su, S. Baldi, and B. De Schutter, "Optimal nonlinear solutions for reverse
Stackelberg games with incomplete information,"
Proceedings of
the 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Las Vegas, Nevada, pp.
5304-5309, Dec. 2016.
Abstract
The reverse Stackelberg game provides a suitable decision-making framework for
hierarchical control problems like network pricing and toll design. We propose
a novel numerical solution approach for systematic computation of optimal
nonlinear leader functions, also known as incentives, for reverse Stackelberg
games with incomplete information and general, nonconcave utility functions. In
particular, we apply basis function approximation to the class of nonlinear
leader functions, and treat the incentive design problem as a standard
semi-infinite programming problem. A worked example is provided to illustrate
the proposed solution approach and to demonstrate its efficiency.
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BibTeX
@inproceedings{SuBal:16-023,
author = {Su, Zhou and Baldi, Simone and De Schutter, Bart},
title = {Optimal Nonlinear Solutions for Reverse {Stackelberg} Games
with Incomplete Information},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control},
address = {Las Vegas, Nevada},
pages = {5304--5309},
month = dec,
year = {2016}
}