Reference
N. Groot, B. De Schutter, and H. Hellendoorn, "Dynamic optimal routing based on
a reverse Stackelberg game approach,"
Proceedings of the 15th
International IEEE Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC
2012), Anchorage, Alaska, pp. 782-787, Sept. 2012.
Abstract
A game-theoretic approach to dynamic routing is proposed in order to maximize
the traffic throughput on a freeway network. While existing methods of
informing drivers of the approximate travel times for the alternative routes do
not in general yield the system optimum, we can achieve a better performance by
introducing a leader-follower game with monetary incentives. In particular, a
control strategy is proposed in which the traffic authority (the leader)
proposes a function that maps the possible travel times for a certain
destination to positive or negative monetary incentives. Based on this function
that is communicated via on-board computers, the drivers (followers) will
rationally choose those travel times associated with an optimal distribution
over the available routes. Finally, in return for the associated monetary
value, the drivers are presented with a route that they should follow to the
desired destination.
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BibTeX
@inproceedings{GroDeS:12-026,
author = {Groot, Noortje and De Schutter, Bart and Hellendoorn, Hans},
title = {Dynamic Optimal Routing Based on a Reverse {Stackelberg} Game
Approach},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 15th International IEEE Conference on
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC 2012)},
address = {Anchorage, Alaska},
pages = {782--787},
month = sep,
year = {2012}
}