Reference
N. Groot, B. De Schutter, and H. Hellendoorn, "Reverse Stackelberg games, Part
I: Basic framework,"
Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE
International Conference on Control Applications, Dubrovnik, Croatia,
pp. 421-426, Oct. 2012.
Abstract
The class of reverse Stackelberg games, also known as incentives, embodies a
structure for sequential decision making that has been recognized as a suitable
approach for hierarchical control problems like road tolling and electricity
pricing. In this game, a leader player announces a mapping of the follower's
decision space into the leader's decision space, after which a follower player
determines his optimal decision variables. Compared to the original Stackelberg
game, the reverse Stackelberg approach has several advantages that will be
emphasized in this survey. Since the reverse Stackelberg game has been studied
in different research areas, first a comprehensive overview is provided of the
definition of the game. Further, several areas of application are stated. In
the companion paper entitled 'Reverse Stackelberg Games, Part II: Results and
Open Issues', main contributions are subsequently summarized along with several
characteristics of the game and open issues that are relevant for further
research, are presented.
Downloads
Companion paper
- N. Groot, B. De Schutter, and H. Hellendoorn, "Reverse Stackelberg games, Part II: Results and open issues," Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE International Conference on Control Applications, Dubrovnik, Croatia, pp. 427-432, Oct. 2012. (abstract, bibtex, tech. report (pdf))
BibTeX
@inproceedings{GroDeS:12-021,
author = {Groot, Noortje and De Schutter, Bart and Hellendoorn, Hans},
title = {Reverse {Stackelberg} Games, {Part I: Basic} Framework},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE International Conference on
Control Applications},
address = {Dubrovnik, Croatia},
pages = {421--426},
month = oct,
year = {2012}
}