Reference
N. Groot, B. De Schutter, and H. Hellendoorn, "Achieving system-optimal
splitting rates in a freeway network using a reverse Stackelberg approach,"
Proceedings of the 13th IFAC Symposium on Control in
Transportation Systems (CTS'2012), Sofia, Bulgaria, pp. 132-137, Sept.
2012.
Abstract
A game-theoretical method is proposed to achieve a system-optimal distribution
of traffic over a freeway network. In particular, the road authority is
represented by a leader player and each follower player embodies a group of
drivers with the same value of time that plan to travel between a given origin
and destination. In the proposed reverse Stackelberg approach, the leader
presents a function to each follower that maps a vector of splitting rates over
possibles routes to a monetary incentive. The follower then decides upon a
splitting rate and the associated monetary incentive that yield the minimum
weighted measure of travel time and monetary fees. In this manner, the road
authority can compose an optimal leader function under which the followers will
behave as desired, i.e., to achieve the system-optimal splitting rates.
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BibTeX
@inproceedings{GroDeS:12-020,
author = {Groot, Noortje and De Schutter, Bart and Hellendoorn, Hans},
title = {Achieving System-Optimal Splitting Rates in a Freeway Network
Using a Reverse {Stackelberg} Approach},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th IFAC Symposium on Control in
Transportation Systems (CTS'2012)},
address = {Sofia, Bulgaria},
pages = {132--137},
month = sep,
year = {2012}
}