Reference
K. Staňková,
G. J. Olsder,
and B. De Schutter, "On European electricity market liberalization: A
game-theoretic approach,"
INFOR: Information Systems and
Operational Research, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 267-280, Nov. 2010.
Abstract
In this paper we deal with the European electricity market liberalization
problem, formulated as a game with electricity producers as players, while the
consumers' electricity demand is exogenous. The producers maximize their profit
by choosing how much electricity they will produce individually by means of
electricity production available to them. The aim of the research presented in
this paper is to investigate the differences between the resulting electricity
prices with different scenarios: a market with one Stackelberg leading
producer, a market with two Stackelberg leading producers being noncooperative
among themselves, and a perfectly competitive market. In the case studies the
games involving one, two, and eight European countries are played. In the
scenarios dealt with in this paper the perfectly competitive market yields the
lowest electricity prices for the consumers. However, we also discuss possible
drawbacks of liberalization. Our research aims to help understanding the
complex process of electricity market liberalization.
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BibTeX
@article{StaDeS:11-003,
author = {Sta{\v{n}}kov{\'{a}}, Kate{\v{r}}ina and Olsder, Geert Jan and De
Schutter, Bart},
title = {On {European} Electricity Market Liberalization: {A}
Game-Theoretic Approach},
journal = {INFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research},
volume = {48},
number = {4},
pages = {267--280},
month = nov,
year = {2010}
}